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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, perhaps because of the influence of the late Justice 
Scalia, the Supreme Court appears to place greater emphasis on text than 
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ever before. “We’re all textualists now,” Justice Kagan declared in 2015.1
But it is one thing to say a court will prioritize the text; it is another to 
choose which text is to be prioritized.
Follow the textualism of constitutional interpretation and one will 
see judges prioritize the public understanding of the privileged white 
men in power at the time of the framing of the constitutional text. Fol-
low the textualism of federal statutory interpretation and one will see 
judges prioritize the text exclusively. If the judges engage with the legis-
lative history of the statute, they will engage with the public understand-
ing of the legislators who enacted the law, again, largely privileged white 
men. The victory of textualism is not necessarily in the outcomes, but in 
significantly narrowing the scope of evidence available to interpret the 
text, in some cases to almost nothing but the bare words of the statute. 
Women, persons of color, and other marginalized persons and entities are 
almost never relevant to the textualist’s gaze.
The narrow focus of the textualist’s gaze also warps how Indian law 
matters are decided. The judiciary rarely considers how the governments 
and people most affected by the text—Indian tribes and individual Indi-
ans—understand the meaning of the text. I will show that the judiciary, 
whether it intends to or not, considers Indians and tribes as extraneous to 
the interpretive process.
McGirt v. Oklahoma,2 decided on the last day of the 2019 Term 
(along with Sharp v. Murphy,3 a companion case), is instructive of the lure 
and limitations of textualism. The cases involved the State of Oklahoma’s 
prosecution of a Muscogee (Creek) Nation citizen for capital murder and 
a Seminole Nation citizen for sex-based crimes committed on non-
Indian lands within the historical reservation boundaries. If the lands re-
main “Indian country,” then the state would not possess jurisdiction.4 A
treaty between the tribe and the United States established the reservation. 
Under long-settled precedents of the Supreme Court, only an Act of 
Congress can terminate the “Indian country” status of an Indian reserva-
1. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, “We Are All Textualists Now”: The Legacy of Justice An-
tonin Scalia, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 303, 304 (2017) (quoting Justice Kagan’s Antonin 
Scalia Lecture at Harvard Law School, Nov. 25, 2015).
2. 140 S. Ct. 2452, rev’g McGirt v. State, No. PC-2018-1057 (Okla. Crim. App. Feb. 
29, 2019).
3. 140 S. Ct. 2412, aff’g Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017).
4. As a general matter, states do not possess criminal jurisdiction over Indians for 
crimes arising in Indian country. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1831) 
(“The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with 
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and 
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees 
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress.”).
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tion.5 Congress never took that action, seemingly preserving the reserva-
tion boundaries. But Oklahoma relied heavily on the allotment of the 
reservation and the weight of history as proof that the reservation should 
be governed by the state.
The Court was deeply split on which text controlled, the treaty es-
tablishing the reservation or the allotment laws. The Murphy case reached 
the Court first, but because Justice Gorsuch had participated in an en 
banc vote in the matter while serving on the Tenth Circuit, he was 
recused. The Court heard argument in December 2018, but did not issue 
an opinion by the end of the Term, apparently split 4-4. Eventually, the 
Court granted cert in a second case with the same legal questions, McGirt,
to resolve the issues presented with a full Court.
Justice Gorsuch’s participation in the McGirt case placed his vote as 
the presumptive tiebreaker, which is exactly what happened—his vote 
broke the tie, and he even wrote the majority opinion. Gorsuch’s McGirt 
opinion is pure textualism writ large. The primary analysis was simply 
that the United States and the Creek Nation created a reservation togeth-
er,6 no Act of Congress expressly disestablished the reservation,7 and so 
the reservation boundaries remain extant. In some of the most formidable 
language ever offered in support of tribal interests, Gorsuch completely 
rejected “extratextual” evidence that once routinely bolstered the Court’s 
reservation boundaries decisions, the kind of evidence mustered by Chief 
Justice Roberts’ dissent:
In the end, only one message rings true. Even the carefully se-
lected history Oklahoma and the dissent recite is not nearly as 
tidy as they suggest. It supplies us with little help in discerning 
the law’s meaning and much potential for mischief. If any-
thing, the persistent if unspoken message here seems to be that 
we should be taken by the “practical advantages” of ignoring 
the written law. How much easier it would be, after all, to let 
the State proceed as it has always assumed it might. But just 
imagine what it would mean to indulge that path. A State ex-
ercises jurisdiction over Native Americans with such persis-
tence that the practice seems normal. Indian landowners lose 
their titles by fraud or otherwise in sufficient volume that no 
one remembers whose land it once was. All this continues for 
5. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984); Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 
1078-79 (2016) (quoting Solem).
6. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2460 (“Start with what should be obvious: Congress estab-
lished a reservation for the Creeks.”).
7. Id. at 2468 (“[T]here simply arrived no moment when any Act of Congress dis-
solved the Creek Tribe or disestablished its reservation.”).
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long enough that a reservation that was once beyond doubt 
becomes questionable, and then even farfetched. Sprinkle in a 
few predictions here, some contestable commentary there, and 
the job is done, a reservation is disestablished. None of these 
moves would be permitted in any other area of statutory in-
terpretation, and there is no reason why they should be per-
mitted here. That would be the rule of the strong, not the rule 
of law.8
As a noted textualist thinker, the fact that it was Gorsuch in this role 
was critical. In 2019, Justice Gorsuch wrote an opinion in an Indian trea-
ty rights case, Washington Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc.,9 that 
focused heavily on how Indians understood the text, in that case a trea-
ty.10 One of most important canons of construction of Indian treaties ar-
ticulated in numerous Supreme Court decisions is that the text of a treaty 
should be interpreted how the Indian treaty negotiators understood the 
treaty at the time of negotiation and ratification.11 Gorsuch privileged the 
Indian (or tribal) understanding of the treaty terms, but was only able to 
persuade one other judge to join his opinion.12
Justice Gorsuch appears to be the rare judge who takes seriously the 
views of Indian tribes in interpreting Indian law. His absence in the Mur-
phy case may have impacted how the parties briefed that case. What is 
absent from the extensive briefing in the Murphy case is how the Mus-
cogee (Creek) Nation, its citizens, and perhaps most importantly, its local 
governments (known as tribal towns) understood the relevant texts. For 
example, it seems relevant, even potentially dispositive, that the tribal 
towns continued governing as if nothing had changed during the entire his-
tory of the federal government’s termination of the tribe’s national gov-
ernment. In McGirt, Justice Gorsuch at least imagined how Creek Indians 
might have understood the text, at one point asserting, “Oklahoma re-
8. Id. at 2474.
9. 139 S. Ct. 1000 (2019).
10. Id. at 1021 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Really, this case just tells 
an old and familiar story. The State of Washington includes millions of acres that the 
Yakamas ceded to the United States under significant pressure. In return, the government 
supplied a handful of modest promises. The State is now dissatisfied with the consequenc-
es of one of those promises. It is a new day, and now it wants more. But today and to its 
credit, the Court holds the parties to the terms of their deal. It is the least we can do.”).
11. E.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905) (“And we have said 
we will construe a treaty with the Indians as ‘that unlettered people’ understood it, and ‘as 
justice and reason demand, in all cases where power is exerted by the strong over those to 
whom they owe care and protection,’ and counterpoise the inequality ‘by the superior 
justice which looks only to the substance of the right, without regard to technical 
rules.’”).
12. Justice Ginsburg joined him. Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct. at 1016.
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plies that . . . many of its residents will be surprised to find out they have 
been living in Indian country this whole time. But we imagine some 
members of the 1832 Creek Tribe would be just as surprised to find 
them there.”13 The focus instead usually is on how the United States, the 
State, and non-Indians understood the texts, exemplified by the Chief 
Justice’s dissent. Textualism’s gaze in prioritizing only non-Indian view-
points warps the analysis.
This Article attempts to address why textualism distorts the Su-
preme Court’s jurisprudence in Indian law. I start with describing textu-
alism in federal public law. I focus on textualism as described by Justice 
Scalia, as well as Scalia’s justification for textualism and discussion about 
the role of the judiciary in interpreting texts. The Court is often subject 
to challenges to its legitimacy rooted in its role as legal interpreter that 
textualism is designed to combat.14
In the next part of the Article, I describe three contested subject ar-
eas of Indian law and how the Court’s imperfect method of textualism 
has impacted the outcomes in those cases. I begin with an area relevant to 
the Murphy case, reservation boundaries cases, which involve a text-heavy 
analysis and should be prototypical examples of the Court’s mastery of 
textualism. I then survey tribal powers matters usually characterized as 
implicit divestiture cases, where the Court finds that an inherent tribal 
power has been divested—the passive voice there is intentional as the 
Court usually does not rely upon a text to reach that conclusion. I con-
clude with an area of law that remains open, federal statutes of general 
applicability that are silent as to Indian tribes, and whether tribes are 
bound by them. These latter two categories test the Court’s dedication to 
textualism.
In the third part, I describe how Indian law is different than other 
areas of law, with unusual and interesting structural, institutional, and 
cognitive biases unique to Indian law matters. Parties in Indian law cases 
often ask the Court to decide cases using arguments for which the Court 
is institutionally weakest, such as deciding whether public policy is served 
by the outcome—in other words, the work of the legislature. At times, 
such as in the pending Murphy case, the Court invites the parties to partic-
ipate in what appears to be an explicitly legislative process. The Court’s 
biases run through federal Indian law and invite the parties to focus on 
policy points rather than the text. If not acknowledged and addressed, 
13. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2479.
14. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory 
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594 (1995) (noting that textualists would argue 
“judicial legitimacy depends on the court’s doing the legislature’s bidding rather than the 
court’s own”).
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this situation all but guarantees that the gaze of the interpreter will never 
fall on Indians and tribes.
Finally, I attempt to formulate a theory of Indian law textualism. As 
with treaty interpretation, the way Indians and tribes understand texts is 
crucial to the interpretation of all relevant texts—and should usually be 
dispositive. Federal Indian affairs statutes are usually more than mere fed-
eral statutes; they are negotiated agreements between sovereign entities: 
the United States and the Indian tribes. To treat a federal Indian affairs 
statute as merely a creature of Congress is wrong.
In short, the Court should seek outcomes that best reflect the un-
derstanding of the relevant texts at the time of their enactment, not as 
they are understood now. This is a blunt instrument. Improper biases 
dominating at the time of a text’s enactment will be an overt part of the 
Court’s decision-making (many observers argue those old biases already 
predominate). But that work is the work of a court and, as Justice Scalia 
suggested in comparing originalism to theories of an evolving constitu-
tion, simplifies the Court’s duties in Indian law. Parties in Indian law cas-
es will begin to strategize accordingly. The only way the judiciary will 
take into consideration the understanding of Indians and tribes is if Indi-
ans and tribes make their understanding known. As the universe of con-
testable matters in Indian law cases shrink, the outcomes of disputes will 
be more predictable and clearer. Finally, though this is a subjective ques-
tion, I predict Indian law will acquire more legitimacy.
I. Textualism
If I want to promote a theory of textualism for deciding Indian law 
cases, I ought to identify broadly what I mean by textualism. As many 
do, I take Justice Scalia’s essay15 that opens A Matter of Interpretation: Feder-
al Courts and the Law as my starting point. Justice Scalia began with a de-
scription of the common law system that existed in England and is still 
often taught in American16 law schools, but which began to fade as soon 
as democratic institutions like elected legislatures came into being.17 Scalia 
then invoked the Legal Process School articulated and originated by Hart 
and Sacks and others.18 Both the judge and the professors agree that the 
15. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutman ed., 1997).
16. I use “American” in reference to the United States.
17. Scalia, supra note 15, at 9-14.
18. The Legal Practice School is shorthand for commentators who advocate for a sepa-
ration of powers theory based on the institutional capacity of each branch of government. 
Diane P. Wood, Legal Scholarship for Judges, 124 YALE L.J. 2592, 2599 (2015).
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judicial process of deciding what the law ought to be is illegitimate in a 
democratic system. Scalia quotes The Legal Process for the proposition that 
American judges are not bound to any particular theory of statutory in-
terpretation (or, perhaps, any theory of judicial decision-making).19
Scalia’s condemnation of judges is legendary. He critiqued judges 
for being dishonest interpreters of statutes, people that reach conclusions 
about what the law ought to be while pretending to merely interpret a 
statute.20 I take from his critique that judges can (1) exploit the lack of 
controlling guidance on theories of statutory interpretation to dishonestly 
announce and apply their own theory of statutory obligation, (2) an-
nounce and identify those theories as within the institutional capacity of 
the judiciary as a means to dishonestly interpret the law in a manner that 
(3) is merely the ideological or emotional preference of judges them-
selves. His theory of textualism derives from the reasoning I suspect was 
driven by an unfounded assumption by himself and others going all the 
way back to the Legal Realists—that most American judges are driven by 
ideology and are willing to lie about it by hiding their prejudices behind 
neutral reasoning. Ask any commentator sympathetic to tribal interests 
and you will get agreement that federal and state judges perform exactly 
the same sleight-of-hand in Indian law (and more than a few observers 
will likely point at Scalia as being one of the worst offenders).21
Justice Scalia’s ultimate theory of textualism was that judges “have 
no authority to pursue . . . broader [social] purposes or write . . . new 
laws.”22 Apparently because legislative intent could conflict with the text 
(and possibly because the judicial pursuit of legislative intent was so 
fraught with the opportunity for illegitimate and dishonest judicial rea-
soning), Scalia’s textualism forbade any inquiry into legislative intent at 
all.23 For Scalia, the ultimate goal of the judge is to divine meaning, not 
19. Scalia, supra note 15, at 14 (quoting HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE 
LEGAL PROCESS 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)).
20. Scalia, supra note 15, at 18-23 (discussing Calabresi and citing WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 50 (1994)).
21. David Getches discovered Justice Scalia’s internal memorandum to Justice Brennan 
in 1990 regarding a matter of inherent tribal criminal prosecution powers in which Scalia 
acknowledged and ratified the view that the Supreme Court has “sought to discern what 
the current state of affairs ought to be” rather than rely exclusively on the legislature’s en-
actments. Memorandum from Antonin Scalia to William Brennan (Apr. 4, 1990), available 
at https://turtletalk.blog/2016/02/17/addendum-to-justice-scalias-record/. Even so, I am 
not arguing Scalia’s dicta here is entirely inconsistent with his brand of textualism, which 
I argue is about limiting the scope of evidence to the views of a narrow class of people.
22. Scalia, supra note 15, at 23.
23. Id. at 22-23, 29-32.
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intent.24 Unlike any form of judicial activist or “strict constructionist,” a
textualist does not interpret a text either liberally or conservatively, but 
“reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”25
I take this statement to be the linchpin for all that makes Scalian 
textualism a deeply troubling interpretive method. Scalia’s glib response 
to attacks on textualism is simply to admit that one might disagree on the 
meaning of a text. His rule is a rule of reason. So long as the meaning is 
reasonable, it is legitimate. What Scalia does here is as brilliant as it is dia-
bolical. Once multiple reasonable meanings have been uncovered, as they 
were in the District of Columbia v. Heller case in which the Court revived 
a robust theory of individual gun rights,26 Scalia’s solution is no different 
than Brennan’s notorious rule of five strategy.27 That strategy (ostensibly 
hated by those who disagreed with the outcomes) is simply a race to five 
votes; whichever judicial block gets there first decides the controlling 
meaning going forward.28 And because the only limiting principle in 
originalism, at least with constitutional texts, is to privilege the statements 
of elite white men exclusively, the result doesn’t really matter. The victo-
ry is in privileging dead, elite, white men—usually slave owners, Indian 
killers, and beneficiaries of laws favoring privileged white men—in the 
resolution of modern constitutional disputes. The same is undeniably true 
in the interpretation of statutes as well, in that the only views relevant 
under this theory are those of the privileged elite who serve in Congress. 
24. See id. at 22-23 (agreeing with quotations of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, such 
as “Only a day or two ago—when counsel talked of the intention of a legislature, I was 
indiscreet enough to say I don’t care what their intention was. I only want to know what 
the words mean.”) (internal citation omitted).
25. Id. at 23. In the realm of constitutional interpretation, where Justice Scalia argued 
the same rules of interpretation should apply, he seems to have anticipated the criticism 
that original meaning is no more discoverable than original intent. Scalia accepted that 
original meaning judges would disagree at times, but he believed that to pursue intent in 
addition to or in replacement of the pursuit of meaning is to wallow in two different areas 
of potential indeterminacy, rather than just one (and was still superior to discerning the 
meaning of a changing constitution). Id. at 45-46.
26. 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008).
27. See Dawn Johnsen, Justice Brennan: Legacy of a Champion, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1151, 
1159 (2013) (reviewing SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL 
CHAMPION (2010)).
28. See, e.g., Eric J. Segall, Opinion, For Supreme Court, It’s Not the Law, It’s the Power 
of Five, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2014, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-xpm-2014-jan-
19-la-oe-segall-5-judge-majority-20140119-story.html (“If it is true, as Justice William 
Brennan used to tell his law clerks, that the most important thing to know about the 
court is the number five — that with five votes, anything is possible — then perhaps it is 
time to seriously reconsider a political system in which five life-tenured, politically unac-
countable judges have the final say on so many of our most pressing problems.”).
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I cannot and will not follow Scalia down this destructively cynical and 
nihilistic road.
II. A Short History of Indian Law Textualism in the 
Supreme Court
Federal statutes and treaties are the bread and butter of federal Indi-
an law. In most cases, the Supreme Court engages with the text and of-
ten holds it to be dispositive. However, as I will show in this Part, one 
difficulty with federal Indian law is that too frequently the Court declines 
to engage with a relevant text or downplays the significance of the text in 
favor of a common-law-style analysis. Another difficulty is that relevant 
texts may conflict, creating multiple interpretations that a Scalian textual-
ist would label reasonable, leaving the judges to vote based on their polit-
ical views. This section is a survey examining important federal Indian 
law decisions in which there is a relevant text and what the Court does 
with that text.
I split this part into three subparts keyed to subject areas of federal 
Indian law: one area in which there tends to be a clear text to apply and 
applies it, one in which the Court declines to engage with a text even 
though one is present, and one in which the text is silent (and involves 
important matters unresolved by the Supreme Court).
A. Engagement with the Text: Reservation Boundaries Cases
Indian reservation boundaries cases typically involve the question of 
jurisdiction over lands within an Indian reservation that are owned by 
persons or entities that are not members of the tribe. Most of these cases 
are criminal law cases29 involving the definition of “Indian country” criti-
cal to determining criminal jurisdiction;30 others involve liquor regula-
tion31 or whether federally owned lands are Indian country. If the non-
member-owned land is within an Indian reservation, then under the 
statute the land is “Indian country.” If the reservation has been disestab-
lished completely or diminished in relevant part, then the nonmember-
owned land is not “Indian country.” The relevant texts usually are the 
treaty, federal statute, or executive order that created the reservation, and 
29. E.g., Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. 
State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
30. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1153 (2012) (defining “Indian country” and extending 
United States jurisdiction over certain criminal offenses committed within it).
31. Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).
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any treaty, federal statute, or executive order that modified the reserva-
tion boundaries.
The Supreme Court takes seriously the relevant texts in reservation 
boundaries cases, but the Court often finds these texts to be ambiguous 
and therefore not dispositive. In Solem v. Bartlett,32 the Supreme Court 
articulated a multi-stage test to determine whether lands within a given 
reservation remain Indian country. The test begins with the text of the 
relevant treaties, statutes, and executive orders. Congress in creating (and 
occasionally modifying) reservations did not use uniform words or 
phrases, and instead seems to have delighted in relying on the thesaurus 
in writing its laws. The creation of a reservation usually is unambiguous. 
The modification of a reservation is almost never unambiguous.
Typically, Congress adopts an allotment plan (or instructs the exec-
utive branch to adopt and implement a plan) for a given reservation. Al-
lotment carved up many reservations that were communally owned by an 
Indian tribe or tribes into small, individual parcels selected by tribal citi-
zens. The remaining land—and there was always land remaining—was 
called “surplus land.” Congress would then authorize the sale of the sur-
plus land. These surplus land acts contained the relevant text modifying a 
given reservation. Since there was no uniformity in crafting surplus land 
acts, and also because the facts on the ground of every reservation dif-
fered, the text of these statutes also differs. Ambiguity reigns.33
The Court acknowledged in Solem that the plain text usually would 
not be dispositive, so it adopted a hierarchy of authorities it would con-
sider next. The Court decided it would look to the circumstances sur-
rounding the implementation of the surplus land act at the time of its en-
actment, then to the time immediately after the enactment, and then 
throughout history until the present. Virtually any piece of relevant evi-
dence was fair game, from legislative history to appropriations requests by 
the Office (later Bureau) of Indian Affairs to the changing demographics 
of the reservation.
In the reservation boundaries cases that followed, the Court almost 
immediately departed from the texts and moved toward the back-end So-
lem analyses, most notably the current demographics of the reservation.34
32. 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984).
33. See Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 431, 486 (2005) (“The Court could continue on its current path, supple-
menting the plenary power of Congress with a judicial common law power. As I have 
explained, however, every feature of this approach is subject to great doctrinal doubt and 
forces the Court to address matters on an unpredictable case-by-case basis that it has the 
least competency to handle.”).
34. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 351 (1998); Hagen 
v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 416 (1994). Justice Scalia joined both majorities.
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Other than the “fairly clean” analytical structure, nothing was certain or 
predictable in how these cases would be decided. As should be obvious 
by now, the outcomes of reservation boundaries disputes are unpredicta-
ble, if not completely random.
The last Supreme Court reservation boundaries case decided, Ne-
braska v. Parker,35 seemed to put an end to much of that nonsense. The 
Court unanimously concluded that Congress did not intend to diminish 
the Omaha Indian Reservation.36 There, the Court relied almost exclu-
sively on the text. The Court disregarded the back-end Solem factors that 
did not support the tribe’s position, notably that the tribe had exercised 
comparatively little authority on portions of the reservation.37 The tribe 
had asked the United States on multiple occasions to sell the portion of 
the reservation at issue (that the government was not successful for the 
most part perhaps affected the optics of the case but was not a critical part 
of the analysis).38 The tribal government had not asserted governance 
power (here, liquor regulation) over the relevant area, ever. The Court 
left for another day the question about the length of time since the tribe 
had last asserted governmental power over the area.39 The text prevailed. 
The remaining Solem factors played little or no role.
McGirt v. Oklahoma may become the most important Indian law de-
cision in decades if Justice Gorsuch’s fidelity to textualism continues to 
prevail in future cases. There, the relevant texts included the treaty estab-
lishing the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s reservation.40 The Creeks granted 
some lands to the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma41 and ceded lands to the 
United States after the Civil War42 but those cessions were not relevant. 
There was, however, an 1898 statute that seemed very much like a ter-
mination statute, a law disestablishing the tribal courts,43 but one that did 
not mention the fate of the reservation. In 1906, Congress explicitly reaf-
firmed the existence of the tribe.44 In 1907, Congress admitted Oklahoma 
into the Union.45
35. 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).
36. Id. at 1076.
37. See id. at 1082 (“[W]e express no view about whether equitable considerations of 
laches and acquiescence may curtail the Tribe’s power to tax the retailers of Pender in 
light of the Tribe’s century-long absence from the disputed lands.”) (citation omitted).
38. Id. at 1081.
39. Id. at 1082.
40. Treaty with the Creeks of Jan. 24, 1826, art. 2, 7 Stat. 286.
41. Treaty with the Creek and Seminole Tribes of Aug. 7, 1856, art. 4, 11 Stat. 699, 
700.
42. Treaty with the Creeks of June 14, 1866, arts. 3, 9, 14 Stat. 785, 786, 788.
43. Curtis Act, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495 (1898).
44. Five Tribes Act, 34 Stat. 137 (1906).
45. Oklahoma Enabling Act, 34 Stat. 267 (1906).
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There was an allotment agreement of 1901 (with modifications in 
1902) that changed the land ownership patterns of the reservation but did 
not alter the reservation boundaries.46 Much of the reservation land is 
now owned by nonmembers. But the Tenth Circuit held that allotment 
alone could not have terminated the reservation.47
In the Murphy case, with Justice Gorsuch recused, Oklahoma at-
tempted to establish the Solem back-end factors, and not the text, as the 
battleground before the Court. Oral argument was all about consequenc-
es to reaffirming the reservation boundaries.48 After oral argument the 
Court asked the parties to brief questions that impliedly repudiated the 
Solem factors.49 Even so, the parties’ supplemental briefs are rife with ar-
gument and facts related to the policy outcomes if the tribal interests pre-
vailed.
There was a text establishing the reservation. There were texts 
amending the reservation boundaries, but not involving lands at issue in 
Murphy or McGirt. There were texts related to the allotment of the reser-
vation, but “Indian country” includes allotted lands. There was no sur-
plus land act to diminish the reservation. If the Court focused on the 
texts alone, these would be easy cases, not unlike Parker. But instead the 
State seemed to be driving the Court in the direction of the policy impli-
cations, not the text. Ultimately, the State garnered four votes, not 
enough to prevail here, but enough to wonder about the fidelity of the 
Court to textualism overall.
46. Original Allotment Agreement of Mar. 1, 1901, 31 Stat. 861; Supplemental Allot-
ment Agreement of June 30, 1902, 32 Stat. 500.
47. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017).
48. E.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 75, Carpenter v. Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 626 
(2018) (No. 17-1107) (“Here are the two earth-shattering consequences that Congress 
can’t fix, Sherrill can’t fix, and this will stimulate you.”) (Lisa Blatt for Oklahoma); id. at 
63 (“If I may, I would like to address three things: First this issue of consequences . . . .”)
(Riyaz Kanji for the Muscogee (Creek) Nation).
49. Carpenter v. Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 626 (2018). The order read:
The parties, the Solicitor General, and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation are di-
rected to file supplemental briefs addressing the following two questions: (1) 
Whether any statute grants the state of Oklahoma jurisdiction over the pros-
ecution of crimes committed by Indians in the area within the 1866 territo-
rial boundaries of the Creek Nation, irrespective of the area’s reservation 
status. (2) Whether there are circumstances in which land qualifies as an In-
dian reservation but nonetheless does not meet the definition of Indian 
country as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
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B. Declining to Engage with the Text: Tribal Powers Cases
Since 1978, the Supreme Court has been preoccupied with tribal 
powers over nonmembers.50 In these cases, Congress has enacted statutes 
that are relevant to the discussion, but the Court has not engaged with 
them consistently. These cases involve the scope of tribal powers—
powers that can only be divested by an Act of Congress or by an Indian 
tribe by agreement. Typically, but not always, when the Court holds a 
tribal power is divested, it is unable (or unwilling) to base its holding on 
federal statutes that tend to support the holding. Most scholars, assuming 
or asserting that the Court cannot identify a relevant text, refer to the 
Court’s actions as implicit divestiture.51 At times, the Court has done so 
as well.
In general, the Supreme Court’s precedents hold that tribal powers 
remain extant unless valid divestiture by Congress or the tribe itself oc-
curs.52 The Court usually requires a clear expression of the intent to di-
vest a tribe of powers, either by Congress or the tribe.53 In the first tribal 
powers case that arguably resulted in an implied divestiture, Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe,54 the Court engaged with dozens of texts to reach 
the conclusion that Indian tribes do not possess the power to prosecute 
non-Indians. None of these texts were controlling Acts of Congress. Ul-
timately, the Court concluded that while none of the texts were disposi-
tive, the texts collectively evidenced an assumption by all branches of the 
federal government, and Indians tribes, too, that tribes never possessed 
the power to prosecute non-Indians. The loose reasoning of the Oliphant 
Court stands in stark contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s decision below in 
which that court applied the normal federal Indian law framework,55 as 
50. E.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (tribal adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indi-
ans); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981) (civil regulatory jurisdic-
tion).
51. E.g., Alex Tallchief Skibine, Constitutionalism, Federal Common Law, and the Inherent 
Powers of Indian Tribes, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 77, 83-99 (2014).
52. E.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
53. E.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883) (“To give to the clauses in the 
treaty of 1868 and the agreement of 1877 effect so as to uphold the jurisdiction exercised 
in this case would be to reverse in this instance the general policy of the government to-
ward the Indians, as declared in many statutes and treaties and recognized in many deci-
sions of this Court from the beginning to the present time. To justify such a departure in 
such a case requires a clear expression of the intention of Congress, and that we have not 
been able to find.”).
54. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
55. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976).
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well as a Supreme Court decision issued mere days after Oliphant that ex-
plicitly applied that rule.56
Ironically, a few years later in a tribal civil jurisdiction case cap-
tioned National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,57 the 
Court restated the Oliphant reasoning to hold that it was the Trade and 
Intercourse Act of 1790 that stripped Indian tribes of jurisdiction to pros-
ecute non-Indians.58 In that Act, Congress provided that American citi-
zens who entered into Indian country without federal permission had 
committed a crime, and Congress required that tribes turn offenders over 
to the United States for punishment.59 The Act does not explicitly divest 
tribes of powers over non-Indians, but perhaps one could read an implied 
divestiture into that text.
Additionally, in the early decades of federal-tribal treaty making, 
tribes and the United States frequently negotiated tribal criminal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians.60 Though the conclusion is fraught with a poten-
tial logical fallacy (negative inferences, the same as with the 1790 Act), it 
is again conceivable that the United States negotiated with tribes in those 
early years with an understanding that the Act created a baseline rule that 
tribes did not possess that power.
The next case involving an implied divestiture of tribal powers, 
Montana v. United States,61 drew from the holding—if not the reasoning—
of the Oliphant case. In Montana, the Court adopted a general rule analo-
gous to Oliphant that tribes do not possess civil regulatory jurisdiction 
over non-Indians. The Court did not adopt a bright-line rule as it did in
Oliphant (likely because there were several precedents affirming tribal civ-
il regulatory and taxing powers over nonmembers), nor did the Court 
explicitly rely upon a text—other than Oliphant itself—that could be read 
as divesting tribes of powers.
As in the Oliphant example, there is a plausible text that supported 
the divesture announced in Montana—the Crow Allotment Act. The 
Court had previously held in a tax case called Goudy v. Meath62 that when 
restricted Indian lands are alienated to nonmembers, the tax immunity 
tied to the restriction on alienation is lifted. The Crow Allotment Act in-
itiated a process by which restricted Indian lands could be alienated to 
56. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
57. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
58. Id. at 853-54.
59. Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137.
60. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Civil, Criminal, and Regulatory Jurisdiction over Non-
members 2 nn. 7-10, in ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUND., INDIAN LAW AND 
NATURAL RESOURCES: THE BASICS AND BEYOND (2017) (collecting treaties).
61. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
62. 203 U.S. 146 (1906).
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nonmembers.63 The allotment act, then, could be read (by analogy) as an 
implied divestiture of tribal powers over the nonmembers on those lands.
Several other cases applying the Montana framework (in other 
words, using Montana as the relevant text rather than an Act of Congress 
or treaty divestiture) can also be explained by a text rather than the Mon-
tana precedent. Brendale v. Yakima can be explained by allotment again.64
Strate v. A-1 Contractors’s limitation on tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction 
over nonmembers can be explained by the federal easement and rights of 
way statutes.65 El Paso v. Neztsosie can be explained by the Price-
Anderson Act.66 Nevada v. Hicks is explained by the Act of Congress es-
tablishing Section 1983.67 Atkinson Trading v. Shirley can be explained by 
the Act of Congress establishing the trading post.68 Plains Commerce Bank 
v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co. can be explained by allotment acts 
(again).69
The next divestiture case after Montana, Duro v. Reina70 decided in 
1990, extended the Oliphant holding to all nonmembers including the 
class of persons known as nonmember Indians. The majority there identi-
fied no text whatsoever to apply, and interestingly drew little from the 
Oliphant reasoning. Oliphant’s history was largely racialized, meaning that 
the texts compared and contrasted Indians and non-Indians. The Duro
Court, which involved carving out some Indians from that dichotomy, 
could not rely on much of that reasoning. Instead, the Court drew from 
likely irrelevant and extra-textual notions such as the theory of the con-
sent of the governed and modern international law critiques of statehood 
such as the “democratic deficit.”71
The most recent tribal powers case, Dollar General v. Mississippi Band 
of Choctaw Indians,72 resulted in a 4-4 tie with no opinion issued. The case 
was an unusual entry in the Supreme Court’s ledger in that it arose on 
tribal lands where the general rule is that tribes do possess civil jurisdiction 
over nonmembers.73 The nonmember business agreed in writing to com-
63. Crow Allotment Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 751.
64. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
65. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
66. 526 U.S. 473 (1999).
67. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
68. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
69. 554 U.S. 316 (2008).
70. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
71. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION,
THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 115 (2002).
72. 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
73. E.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) (power to 
issue hunting and fishing licenses); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) 
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ply with tribal laws. In addition, there was no text that could be con-
strued as divesting the tribe of authority over the nonmember. Even so, 
at least a few Supreme Court judges speculated that the text of the Con-
stitution divested tribes of authority over nonmembers.74 That text? The 
statement in the Constitution that “[t]he judicial power of the United
States[] shall be vested in one Supreme Court. . . .”75 For these judges, 
any other judicial power within the United States (read: tribal judicial 
power) that was not beholden to the Supreme Court (again, read: tribal 
judicial power) was inherently invalid. Perhaps we should consider the 
Constitution’s Article III text as an existential threat to tribal judicial 
power. Even so, some Justices’ effort to locate a limitation on tribal pow-
ers in the Constitution is a departure from cases like Duro v. Reina.
In all of the Court’s tribal powers cases in which the Court finds 
tribal powers limited, there is a text that speaks to the scope of tribal 
powers, at least impliedly. In few of these cases does the Court treat that 
text as dispositive. In some cases, like Oliphant and Hicks, the Court fo-
cuses on extratextual matters at length. Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hicks, in 
which Section 1983 was the relevant text, does not engage with that text 
directly until the third to last paragraph of Part V of the opinion, and 
then only in response to Justice O’Connor.76
C. Unresolved Area: Federal Statutes of General Applicability
Whether a federal statute of general applicability that is silent as to 
Indian tribes applies to tribes is a notoriously open and contested ques-
tion. The primary texts, federal statutes of general applicability, are silent 
as to tribal interests. These texts run up against a general rule adopted by 
the Supreme Court (but, as I have shown, intermittently applied) that 
Congress may impose limitations on tribal sovereignty if it makes a clear 
expression of its intent to do so.
Consider the Sixth Circuit’s recent cases involving two Michigan 
tribes and the National Labor Relations Board, NLRB v. Little River Band 
(power to tax); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 
134 (1980) (same).
74. Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw 
Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496) (suggesting the Constitution is a re-
striction on Indian tribes even if the text of the Constitution does not so provide: “The 
Constitution runs to the people. The people have a right to insist on the Constitution 
even if Mississippi or the Federal government doesn’t care”) (Justice Kennedy).
75. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
76. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 370-74 (2001).
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of Ottawa Indians Tribal Government77 and Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort.78
In Little River, a split panel held that the National Labor Relations Act 
applied to tribes as regular, non-governmental employers under the 
statute. The majority, consisting of one regular active circuit judge and 
one senior circuit judge, held that the Act constituted an implicit 
divestiture by Congress of the power of tribes to regulate labor relations 
with nonmembers.79 In Soaring Eagle, another split decision, the majority 
went to great lengths to disagree with the Little River majority, only to 
hold that the first panel’s holding controlled the outcome in Soaring Eagle,
too.80 Of the five active circuit judges, somehow four of them would 
have held that the Act was inapplicable to Indian tribes, but the tribes lost 
both cases.
The analytical structures of the D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit 
differ from each other and that of the Little River majority, but these cir-
cuits have all reached the same outcome.81 The Tenth Circuit is the only 
circuit to apply the clear expression analysis.82 Other circuits tend to fol-
low the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning.83
The Little River majority’s reasoning is arguably consistent with how 
the Supreme Court deals with tribal powers over nonmembers but devi-
ates from how the Supreme Court deals with tribal powers over tribal 
members. The Little River majority effectively treated the casino employ-
ees who were tribal members as nonmembers. Most of the tribe’s em-
ployees were (are) tribal members. To say that the National Labor Rela-
tions Act strips tribes of powers to regulate labor relations of tribal 
members cannot be right. On the nonmember front, recall that the stat-
utes the Court relied upon (or could have relied upon) were all Indian 
affairs laws, often tribe-specific. To say that the Act could be construed to 
impliedly divest tribes of powers over nonmembers would be the first 
time a statute that is not focused on an aspect of Indian affairs strips tribes 
of power.
77. NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 537 (6th 
Cir. 2015).
78. Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015).
79. Little River, 788 F.3d at 551-55.
80. Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 662.
81. San Manual Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 
2007); Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 1985).
82. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1195 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
83. See, e.g., Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 1996); 
Menominee Tribal Enters. v. Solis, 601 F.3d 669, 670 (7th Cir. 2010); Florida Paraplegic 
Ass’n v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 1129-30 (11th Cir. 1999). 
But see EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Const. Co., 986 F.2d 246, 249 (8th Cir. 
1993).
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In sum, these cases expose the judiciary as undisciplined interpreters 
of texts. Consistent with Scalia’s harsh criticism of judges, it is plausible 
that each of these courts was outcome-oriented, choosing an outcome 
and then casting about for the most plausible theory to support the out-
come. Also consistent with Scalia’s criticism, there seems to be no gener-
alized theory of interpretation that parties and stakeholders can rely upon 
to predict outcomes in other cases. Finally, the Indian and tribes’ voices
are virtually non-existent in these cases. Why?
III. Indian Law and Supreme Court’s Process
Indian law is different. Indian tribes (and Indians) are the only sov-
ereigns and persons explicitly mentioned in the Constitution identified by 
race and ancestry (excepting the “three-fifths of all other persons” eu-
phemism). Despite being identified in the Constitution, Indian tribes are 
not governed by the Constitution and the Constitution does not confer 
citizenship upon Indians (specifically, “Indians not taxed”). The wealth 
and power of the United States derived from slavery and the vast re-
sources stripped from Indians and tribes. These and other factors create 
complex structural, institutional, and cognitive biases the judges bring to 
their work in federal Indian law. These biases stretch and twist federal 
Indian law jurisprudence in unusual and strange ways.
A. Structural Biases
The Constitution simply does not govern or regulate tribal powers. 
The Constitution primarily deals with states and the federal government. 
Indian tribes and foreign nations are tangential to the main business of the 
Constitution. When a state or federal interest conflicts with a tribal or 
foreign interest, the judiciary almost always favors the interests an-
nounced and governed in the Constitution (state and federal interests) ra-
ther than those of other governments (tribes and foreign nations). This 
bias directly affects tribal conflicts with states and the federal government. 
Tribal interests generally do not prevail in preemption disputes with state 
governments unless the United States weighs in with a strong federal in-
terest. Reliance upon a relevant and dispositive text is the primary means 
for tribal interests to prevail here. Treaty rights cases tend to favor tribal 
interests as a result.
The Constitution also vests Indian affairs powers with Congress, 
creating an additional structural bias favoring the federal government over 
state governments. But the delegation of Indian affairs powers is, for 
some, incomplete. The Constitution specifically granted Congress powers 
to regulate commerce with Indian tribes. Congress used that power in 
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1790 to preempt the field of Indian affairs. The Constitution also estab-
lished the Treaty Power, which the United States had already been using 
to govern relations with Indian tribes. The United States continued in-
voking the Treaty Power with tribes until 1871. Indian law primarily is 
federal. Because federal power in Indian affairs is plenary, the judiciary is 
extremely unlikely to strike down federal statutes for lack of federal pow-
er, whether tribal or individual Indian interests favor the laws or not. The 
judiciary has affirmed the authority of the federal government to impose 
incredibly disruptive programs on Indian and tribal interests, such as fed-
eralizing Indian country criminal jurisdiction and privatizing Indian res-
ervations. The judiciary also has confirmed the power of the federal gov-
ernment to establish and maintain an enormous bureaucracy dedicated to 
administering Indian affairs in cooperation with tribal governments.
The Constitution acknowledges states, foreign nations, and Indian 
tribes as sovereign entities. The Constitution provides for how state sov-
ereign powers are to be regulated but says little on foreign nations and 
Indian tribes. The close grouping of foreign nations and Indian tribes, the 
federal primacy in Indian affairs, and the extensive use of the Treaty 
Power and War Powers in dealing with Indian tribes all helped to estab-
lish a special relationship between the federal government and Indian 
tribes analogous to the relationship of the federal government to foreign 
nations. The Supreme Court historically assumed that the special rela-
tionship was therefore akin to foreign affairs matters left exclusively to the 
other branches of the federal government under the political question 
doctrine. The judiciary’s deference to the federal government further 
supports federal legislative programs in Indian affairs, both for the benefit 
and detriment of Indian and tribal interests.
The acknowledgement of Indian tribes and individual Indians in the 
text of the Constitution (as well as the euphemism referencing the slavery 
of African Americans and others) initially created a bias in favor of race-
based classifications in law. The Reconstruction Amendments presumably 
reversed that bias, but Indian tribes and individual Indians remain in the 
Constitution’s text. The colorblindness/antidiscrimination policies of the 
post-Reconstruction Amendments Constitution should be inapplicable to 
Indian affairs statutes creating what otherwise would be considered racial 
classifications so long as they fulfill the purposes of the federal-tribal trust 
relationship,84 but the judiciary remains conflicted about this area. The 
Constitution’s text begs the question of which entities are “Indian tribes”
and which persons are “Indians,” with the judiciary historically deferring 
to Congress and the executive branch on those questions.85 However, in 
84. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-55 (1978).
85. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Politics, Indian Law, and the Constitution, 108 CALIF. L.
REV. 495 (2020).
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recent decades this deference is grudging and skeptical given the color-
blindness/antidiscrimination principles embedded in the modern Consti-
tution.
Because Indian law is so federalized, Indian affairs legislation is be-
holden to Congressional political processes. The federal legislative process 
is a lumbering behemoth, slow to act, slow to respond, and inclusive of
political interests on all sides, even those completely irrelevant to Indian 
affairs. There could be far more statutes to deal with gaps in federal Indi-
an law, but there are not, leaving the judiciary to fill those gaps.
Finally, because Indian law is federalized, Constitutionalized, and 
riddled with disputes and conflicts, the Supreme Court accepts a dispro-
portionally high share of Indian affairs cases for review. Because there are 
many gaps in the law and confusion in the lower courts, the Court is fre-
quently tempted to behave as a common law court. And when the Court 
makes policy, the difficulty of the federal legislature to respond (even 
when it disapproves of the judiciary’s policy choices) reinforces the 
Court’s actions. It is all too easy for the Supreme Court to make a policy 
choice and then mention that Congress can alter the landscape of the law 
if it so chooses. The failure of Congress to act allows the Court to later 
assume that the judiciary got it right.
These structural biases all but guarantee that the Indian and tribal 
understanding of federal Indian affairs statutes will never be part of the 
interpretation of those statutes. Justice Kennedy’s repeated assertion that 
Indian tribes are extra-constitutional preserved for decades the percep-
tions that Indians and tribes were outsiders to the American political and 
legal processes, and that their views are irrelevant.
B. Institutional Competencies (and Biases)
The Supreme Court’s roles include resolving important federal mat-
ters of law and resolving conflicts in law in the lower courts. These roles 
are articulated in the Court’s Rule 10, which provides the standards for 
certiorari decisions. Indian law usually is not considered an “important 
area of federal law,” unlike say, affirmative action, abortion, freedom of 
religion, gerrymandering, and the like, so that aspect of the Court’s role 
is limited. However, in this category likely belongs federal statutes that 
have been struck down by lower courts. In Indian law, this is truly a rare 
circumstance. Still, like any federal statute struck down, a decision strik-
ing down an Indian affairs law will be reviewed by the Court. Addition-
ally, perhaps because of the structural biases described above (and likely 
because of the cognitive biases described below), tribal assertions of pow-
er over nonmembers attract the Court’s attention. Finally, because Indi-
ans and tribes are always suing the United States over breaches of the 
government’s trust duties to Indian and tribal interests (and occasionally 
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win), the Court tends to think of successful money damages awards 
against the government as implicating an important federal interest suffi-
cient to justify review.
Splits in lower court authority are relatively rare. The vast majority 
of federal court decisions in Indian affairs are made by the Ninth, Tenth, 
and Eighth Circuits (in decreasing numerical order). Splits in authority 
involving federal or state criminal jurisdiction do happen amongst federal 
and state courts, though not often, but these splits in authority tend to 
force the Court’s hand by implicating both splits in authority and 
(relatively) important federal interests. As a result, reservation boundary
matters that are reservation-specific (or “factbound,” in the Court’s 
parlance) tend to attract the attention of the Court even without a split in 
authority.
The Court plays a role in policing the separation of powers between 
the federal branches and in moderating federalism disputes between the 
federal and state governments. Disputes between states and Indian tribes 
in which the state loses below tend to be reviewed at a higher rate by the 
Court, likely influenced by the structural biases described in the previous 
subpart. State disputes with the federal government over Indian affairs 
decisions are the same.
The Supreme Court also polices the lower federal courts by enforc-
ing the limited jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. Sovereign immunity 
cases—federal, state, and tribal—are seemingly ever-present on the 
Court’s docket, as are Article III standing cases. Perhaps because of the 
structural biases described above, plaintiffs opposing tribal interests almost 
always have standing, but tribal interests do not.86
The institutional tools of the Supreme Court are many, but also 
limited in scope. Many Indian affairs cases decided by the Supreme Court 
involve constitutional and statutory interpretation cases, or texts. This is 
in the heartland of the Supreme Court’s work. Many Indian affairs cases 
require the Court to delve into the archives for historical resources and
make judgments about them, also part of the Court’s competency.
As an institution with limited powers whose influence depends en-
tirely on persuasion and the legitimacy of the institution, the Supreme 
Court cannot be a policy court. But it is, and it always has been. Advo-
cates know this, which is why the Court is peppered with numerous 
amicus briefs, sometimes dozens, sometimes hundreds, in every single case 
86. Compare Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 
567 U.S. 209, 227-28 (2012) (holding non-Indian neighbors to Indian lands have stand-
ing to challenge federal agency actions involving those lands), with Inyo County, Calif., v. 
Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701, 
712 (2003) (holding Indian tribe is not a “person” under Section 1983 with standing to 
sue state governments for violations of federal law).
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it reviews. Many of these amicus briefs are straight-up legal arguments 
(often repetitive of the merits briefs of the parties), but the more influen-
tial briefs bring to the Court’s attention other types of information rele-
vant to the Court’s decision. These often are straight-up policy briefs, not 
much different than the reports and testimony that advocates submit to 
Congress or the executive branch. The Court has not acknowledged or 
dealt with this issue in a meaningful or transparent way, but the Court 
has no institutional capacity to interrogate the claims made in these policy 
briefs.
Lower courts can hold trials where evidence and witnesses are inter-
rogated and examined, but not the Supreme Court. It is here where the 
Court is at its weakest institutionally, but the Court allows observers to 
assume that this is where the Court is strongest. These policy briefs can 
have outsized influence on the Court by treading a careful line of making 
aggressive assertions of fact and policy and making illegitimate and out-
landish representations. The Court’s proxy for determining the validity of 
an amici’s claims is the author of the brief or the institution filing the 
brief. This method is fraught with potential error and riddled with the 
potential for abuse by zealous and passionate advocates.
This is especially so in Indian affairs cases. Indian affairs matters are 
not matters of general knowledge, they are often reservation-specific, and 
prone to confabulation by advocates. The Court’s institutional capacity to 
govern and moderate the amici is perilously and dangerously (for tribal 
interests, mostly) inadequate. Repeatedly the Court has been told by trib-
al and Indian interests—and their opponents—that a decision in an Indi-
an affairs case will lead to monumental policy consequences, only for 
those consequences to be illusory. Perhaps the worst example of this 
phenomenon, although far from the only one, is City of Sherrill v. Oneida 
Indian Nation,87 where the Court adopted a legal theory it had previously 
and expressly rejected in earlier cases that had been proposed by a fringe 
amicus that no party briefed at any stage of litigation. This theory de-
manded extensive fact-finding by a trier of fact, and the Court applied 
that theory to the case at hand without any briefing or opportunity for 
the tribe to litigate the merits of that theory or establish facts relevant to
that theory.
C. Cognitive Biases
The Supreme Court’s Indian affairs precedents are riddled with bi-
ased statements about Indians and tribes, statements that occasionally gov-
erned the outcome of cases. The Court in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United 
87. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
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States,88 decided a year after Brown v. Board by the same group of judges, 
referred to what “every American schoolboy knows”: that Indian treaties 
were shams perpetrated by Americans on uncivilized and ignorant Indian 
people. The Court in Ex parte Crow Dog89 excused Crow Dog from fed-
eral criminal prosecution in part because as an ignorant savage he would 
be unfairly treated in federal court by civilized laws and lawyers.90
Throughout the Indian law canon, Indian people are referred to as “in-
competents,” “wards,” unlettered, people without laws, uncivilized hea-
thens, and so on.91 Regardless of the language used, the Court’s Indian 
affairs jurisprudence depends on the presumed inferiority of Indian peo-
ple.
One would like to think that a modern, more enlightened Supreme 
Court would no longer characterize Indian people with dour derision 
and mockery as a matter of course, but the Court’s framing of the “Indi-
an-ness” of the Cherokee father and daughter in Adoptive Couple v. Baby 
Girl proves that hope wrong.92
88. 348 U.S. 272, 290 (1955).
89. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
90. The Court’s infamous language is worthy of reproduction in the margin:
The nature and circumstances of this case strongly reinforce this rule of in-
terpretation in its present application. It is a case involving the judgment of a 
court of special and limited jurisdiction, not to be assumed without clear 
warrant of law. It is a case of life and death. It is a case where, against an ex-
press exception in the law itself, that law, by argument and inference only, is 
sought to be extended over aliens and strangers; over the members of a 
community, separated by race, by tradition, by the instincts of a free though 
savage life, from the authority and power which seeks to impose upon them 
the restraints of an external and unknown code, and to subject them to the 
responsibilities of civil conduct, according to rules and penalties of which 
they could have no previous warning; which judges them by a standard 
made by others, and not for them, which takes no account of the conditions 
which should except them from its exactions, and makes no allowance for 
their inability to understand it. It tries them not by their peers, nor by the 
customs of their people, nor the law of their land, but by superiors of a dif-
ferent race, according to the law of a social state of which they have an im-
perfect conception, and which is opposed to the traditions of their history, 
to the habits of their lives, to the strongest prejudices of their savage nature; 
one which measures the red man’s revenge by the maxims of the white 
man’s morality.
Id. at 571.
91. E.g., Drummond v. United States, 324 U.S. 316, 318 (1945) (“incompetent Indi-
an”); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 724 (1983) (“Indian wards”); United States v. 
Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1908) (“unlettered”); Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60, 
62 (1906) (“uncivilized”).
92. 570 U.S. 637 (2013).
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Perhaps the Court has improved on that front generally, but even 
now the Court can be expected to assert biased, factually unsupportable 
claims about Indian tribes. The Court, in majority and in additional 
opinions, has asserted that Indian tribes are “extra-constitutional,”93 are 
“quasi-sovereign nations,”94 or, in Justice Thomas’ view, are not sover-
eign at all.95 The Court claims that tribal court procedures are “unusually 
difficult” for nonmember litigants.96 The Court asserts that since non-
members cannot vote, serve on juries, or run for tribal office, they are 
therefore political outsiders who cannot expect due process or fairness 
under tribal law from tribal governments. And the Court still rests heavily 
on the old guardian-ward metaphor that Congress and the executive 
branch discarded long ago.
For the judiciary, modern tribes are worse than historical tribes. 
Historical tribes were under the thumb of the federal government. Mod-
ern tribes have resources, self-governance powers, and the federal gov-
ernment (usually) backing them up. The judiciary presumes, in some cas-
es as a matter of law, that modern tribes are inherently disruptive to and 
competitive with state and local governments, and adverse to nonmem-
ber individuals, businesses, and other organizations.
Consider City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation,97 where the Su-
preme Court armed non-tribal governments and non-Indians with equi-
table defenses designed to protect non-tribal interests.98 There, a tribe re-
purchased reservation land illegally alienated from the tribe centuries 
earlier and asserted an immunity from local taxes on that land.99 The 
Court said too much time had passed, and that the tribe’s immunities 
were too disruptive to the non-Indian governments and citizens to be al-
lowable.100 The potential scope of that Court’s reasoning is vast, and truly 
an existential threat to Indian tribes.
Most fundamentally, the judiciary views Indians and tribes as out-
siders—even foreigners—to the American legal and political world. The 
federal government’s jealous preservation of its dominance in Indian af-
93. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 213 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment).
94. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978).
95. E.g., Lara, 541 U.S. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (referring to 
tribal sovereignty as a “doubtful assumption”).
96. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 385 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring).
97. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
98. Id. at 215.
99. Id. at 202.
100. Id. at 215 n.9 (“The relief OIN seeks—recognition of present and future sovereign 
authority to remove the land from local taxation—is unavailable because of the long lapse 
of time, during which New York’s governance remained undisturbed, and the present-
day and future disruption such relief would engender.”).
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fairs was initially tied to the outsider, foreign status of Indians and tribes. 
Even now that Indians are U.S. citizens and Indian tribes are ingrained in 
federal, state, and local government affairs, the judiciary continues to 
place the outsider status label on Indians and tribes. In the Murphy case, 
for example, despite the fact that the Muscogee (Creek) Nation had done 
important work and expended vast resources to govern and care for Indi-
an and non-Indian citizens within its reservation, the Court seemed un-
impressed and uninterested, apparently worrying more about tax revenue 
than good governance.101
IV. Theorizing Indian Law Textualism
Indians and tribes have no built-in advantages. For Indians and 
tribes, the history of Indian law is of no comfort, and the numerous bias-
es of the judiciary make every case a presumptive loser. In this environ-
ment, those arguing for Indian and tribal interests have no real choice but 
to rely on a text. Every case depends on framing a matter with the best 
text possible. But how to know what texts will matter? And how to 
know when texts will not matter at all?
There are two theories of Indian law textualism, that of Scalia (and 
pretty much every other textualist) and that of Gorsuch. Scalia’s textual-
ism is nihilistic and cynical. Gorsuch’s theory, though applied in only one 
case so far, is perhaps as cynical but far less nihilistic.
I have mentioned Scalia’s textualism as it applies in Indian affairs 
cases. In short, while Scalia’s followers might chafe at this characteriza-
tion, Scalian textualism would simply require the judge to locate the uni-
verse of reasonable original public meanings of a text, select the mean-
ing(s) the judge believes is the best reasonable meaning (and yes, political 
or ideological choices are completely acceptable), assert that the selected 
meaning is the only truly reasonable meaning, and persuade four judges 
out of the remaining eight to agree. This textualism, which predominates 
throughout the nation, is subject to the same criticism that Scalia leveled 
against liberal, “activist” judges.
Scalia was not even adherent to his own brand of textualism, espe-
cially in the later stages of his career. In Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian 
Community,102 for example, he wrote a separate dissent to highlight that 
his policy views on tribal sovereign immunity had changed, compelling 
him to switch his vote from an earlier case, Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing 
101. Justice Ginsburg’s lone question in the Murphy argument involved tax. Transcript 
of Oral Argument, supra note 48, at 35.
102. 572 U.S. 782, 814 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Technologies,103 even though the legal texts had remained exactly the same. 
Scalia’s individual dissent in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,104 in which he 
broke from a five-judge majority including four conservatives like him-
self, also reeks of a policy preference determining his vote—in that case, 
about father’s rights.
Scalian textualism embraces canons of statutory construction, as de-
scribed both in A Matter of Interpretation and in the treatise on textual can-
ons he coauthored with Bryan Garner. Despite the prominence of the 
canons of construing Indian treaties and Indian affairs statutes and the var-
ious examples of the clear statement or expression rules that the Supreme 
Court has imposed on judges interpreting Indian affairs texts, Scalia and 
Garner make no mention whatsoever of these canons in the treatise. Nor did 
Scalia apply them in his Indian law decisions.
Justice Gorsuch, in his Washington State Department of Licensing v. 
Cougar Den105 concurrence, seems to have employed what could be called 
Indian law originalism. In that case, which involved the interpretation of 
an Indian treaty,106 Gorsuch relied exclusively on evidence of the under-
standing of that treaty by the Indians who negotiated that treaty, and rep-
resentations made by those on the American side consistent with the Indi-
an understanding. Gorsuch casually tossed aside any modern 
understanding that differed or modified the original understanding, fram-
ing the issue as “adopting the interpretation most consistent with the 
treaty’s original meaning.”107 Significantly, while dissenters raised the 
specter of horrific policy consequences flowing from the interpretation of 
the treaty favored by the majority,108 Gorsuch was having none of it. 
Gorsuch’s nascent theory of Indian law originalism took the discipline 
demanded by aspects of Scalia’s textualism, most notably the separation of 
text from judicial policy preferences, and applied it simply.109
It is now clear that Cougar Den wasn’t a one-time-only deal with 
Justice Gorsuch. Any textual theory that prioritizes text over the policy 
preferences of unelected judges—preferences that likely arise from the 
103. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
104. 570 U.S. 637, 667-68 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1016 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534–35 (1991)).
108. E.g., id. at 1026 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The problem is that today’s ruling for 
Cougar Den preempts the enforcement of any regulation of goods on the highway that 
does not concern travel safety—such as a prohibition on the possession of potentially con-
taminated apples taken from a quarantined area (a matter of vital concern in Washing-
ton).”).
109. Id. at 1021 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In the end, then, the only 
true threat to tribal interests today would come from replacing the meaningful right the 
Yakamas thought they had reserved with the trivial promise the State suggests.”).
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various structural, institutional, and cognitive biases of the judiciary—is 
an improvement, perhaps even a paradigmatic improvement. That Justice 
Ginsburg––the author of City of Sherrill, an opinion that pointedly dis-
carded the text in favor of policy preferences––joined Gorsuch’s Cougar 
Den’s concurrence and his McGirt majority opinion is also suggestive that 
she shares his views on textualism in the Indian law context.
In short, the deeply split McGirt decision shows that the Court still 
has no dominant theory. Textualism is on the minds of the judges, but 
the discipline to accept the outcomes that textualism brings prevailed by a 
solitary vote.
A. The Role of Indians and Tribes in Federal Indian Affairs Legislation
Indian affairs statutes are all about Indians and Indian tribes. These 
statutes cover an enormous amount of contested ground, literally and fig-
uratively. They involve subject areas in which the federal government is 
not typically a player, including areas of law some observers and judges 
claim are outside the scope of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has 
held conclusively that any federal statute rationally related to the fulfill-
ment of the federal government’s trust responsibility, or duty of protec-
tion, is valid.110
It is now normal and expected that Indian tribes will be involved in 
the crafting of federal legislation. It is fair to say nearly all federal Indian 
affairs statutes and regulations of the last fifty years originated with re-
quests for action by tribal interests. The Supreme Court in Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,111 overruling National League of Cit-
ies v. Usery112 which had given teeth the Tenth Amendment, placated 
states by reminding them that they had a special place in the structure of 
the American lawmaking apparatus—they could cause the introduction 
of legislation and influence that legislation. Indian tribes hold a special 
place in American lawmaking, too, though that role obviously differs 
from the roles of states. But in Indian affairs legislation, tribal interests 
should play at least as critical a role as those of states. While states and the 
federal government are important players in Indian law, often they are 
competitors to the tribes’ interests. When it comes to Indian affairs laws 
of the last half-century, there surely will be tribal statements and actions 
communicating the tribes’ understanding of the meaning of those texts. 
The judiciary must take those statements in consideration when inter-
preting those texts. The same holds for older texts, even ones in which 
110. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).
111. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
112. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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Indian tribes and individual Indians had no say, perhaps most especially 
for those texts.
B. Toward a Rule of Interpreting Indian Affairs Texts—Tribes as Partners in 
the Creation of Indian Law
The canons of construing Indian treaties provide a model for a gen-
eral rule for interpreting Indian affairs texts. Already, courts are obligated 
to interpret ambiguous terms in both treaties and statutes to the benefit of 
tribal interests. Already, courts are obligated to take historical context in-
to consideration when interpreting treaties. Already, courts are obligated 
to interpret a treaty’s text in light of how the Indians of that time under-
stood the text. Already, courts are obligated to analyze certain Indian af-
fairs laws under a clear statement or clear expression rubric.
The reality is that when it comes to interpreting Indian affairs stat-
utes, the judiciary too often treats these canons as voluntary. And if a 
court relies on these canons, they often do so in support of an outcome 
favoring tribal interests reached on other grounds, sort of like frosting on 
top. And some judges refuse to respect the canons at all. After all, Scalia 
did not even acknowledge any of these canons in his exhaustive treatise on 
interpretative canons.
The structural, institutional, and cognitive biases permeating the ju-
diciary and the legal system help to explain why the canons are so disre-
spected. Perhaps the only way to combat the biases is to take Indians’ and 
tribes’ understanding of the meanings of these texts into greater consider-
ation. But courts are unlikely to do so unless they acknowledge their bi-
ases and take affirmative steps to combat them.
One important first step, and perhaps the biggest step, is to 
acknowledge as a matter of law that Indian tribes are domestic sovereigns 
that participate in federal legislative processes, usually initiating and later 
guiding Congress’s Indian affairs enactments. There is a lengthy history of 
federal-tribal negotiation leading to the creation of federal law. The most 
direct arms-length federal-tribal lawmaking was Indian treatymaking, 
which nominally ended in 1869, the year the Senate ratified the last Indi-
an treaty. But treatymaking did not end there. The United States contin-
ued to negotiate sovereign-to-sovereign agreements with Indian tribes, at 
least one of which the Supreme Court interpreted as it effectively was a 
treaty.113 Those negotiated agreements—effectively treaties ratified as reg-
ular legislation—continued to be ratified by Congress in this way for dec-
ades after 1869. Many of them were allotment agreements. At times, it 
113. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (interpreting 1888 agreement with 
tribe enacted by Congress as legislation consistent with the Indian treaty canons).
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might appear that Congress did act unilaterally, such as when it terminat-
ed the tribal courts in Oklahoma in 1898, but even in that instance, there 
was tribal input and participation in drafting the legislation. Importantly, 
tribal courts continued operating under limited jurisdiction, a fact later 
confirmed by a federal court in 1909.114
Even today, Congress continues to enact Indian affairs statutes at 
tribal request. Indian claims settlements for money damages, land restora-
tion, water rights, and so on are ratified by Congress after arms-length 
negotiations. The interpretation of these Acts of Congress should abso-
lutely take into consideration the understanding of tribal interests—to do 
otherwise would be equivalent to allowing one side to a contract to dic-
tate how the contract is to be enforced. Consider the Michigan Indian 
Land Claims Settlement Act,115 which involved payments by the United 
States to five Indian tribes, each of which was asked to write a section of 
the law to explain how each of the tribes would use the money. Con-
gress ratified the law as written by the tribes. Indian tribes are unusual in 
this way in American law.
Even when Congress passes general Indian affairs statutes that apply 
to all Indians and tribes, tribal participation in the political process is ro-
bust. Consider the negotiation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 
1988,116 in which federal agencies, tribal leaders, and states hammered out 
a complex legislative scheme that was for all practical purposes a negotiat-
ed settlement ratified by Congress. How tribal interests understood that 
statute is at least as important as how the United States and state govern-
ments understood it for purposes of interpreting it.
Interpretation of federal statutes always starts with the text and, if 
the text is ambiguous, the courts often will eventually look at legislative 
history. The evidence most favored by the courts includes the statements 
of the House or Senate committees that passed the bill in the first place. 
To use that evidence alone in interpreting Indian affairs statutes and ig-
nore the understanding of tribal interests (and other interests, too, such as 
the states who worked on IGRA) is simply a poor practice. But that is 
the practice, unfortunately.
Forget voluntary or useful canons, I would require the judiciary in 
every case in which an Indian affairs text is being interpreted to consider 
how affected Indians and tribes understand the meaning of that text. 
114. Hayes v. Barringer, 168 F. 221 (8th Cir. 1909), cited in F. Browning Pipestem & G. 
William Rice, The Mythology of the Oklahoma Indians: A Survey of the Legal Status of Indian 
Tribes in Oklahoma, 6 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 259, 297 (1978).
115. Pub. L. No. 105-143, 111 Stat. 2652, 2658 (1997).
116. Pub. L. 100–497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 
2701-2721 (2012)).
140 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 25:2
Textualism is wholly illegitimate. Indian law is wholly illegitimate with-
out that analysis.
C. Impacts of Indian Law Textualism on the Cases
Consider several of the cases advocates for tribal interests cite as the 
worst Indian law decisions. I will try to show not that the outcomes of 
these cases would have been changed, but that the reasoning of these cas-
es would have been improved if tribal understanding of the laws at issue 
were incorporated into the analysis. Legitimacy is not exclusively about 
outcomes; it is about persuasion. Tribal interests must be persuaded, too, 
in our system of legal dispute resolution.
1. Reservation Boundaries Cases
Most reservation boundaries cases are resolved by reference to a text 
that authorizes and implements the allotment of the reservation. While 
allotment is now widely understood as a terrible policy inflicted on Indi-
an people and tribes by the federal government, it should be understood 
that allotment was often negotiated between the United States and the 
tribes (although the federal government usually made clear the tribe 
would have no choice on the fact of allotment).117 Allotment statutes 
should be interpreted in light of the understanding of the tribal partners, 
and not exclusively by considering how the federal government under-
stood allotment.
Requiring courts to take the tribal perspective into consideration 
would streamline the back-end portions of the Solem v. Bartlett structure. 
Assuming a court engaged in that analysis (recall the Court skipped it in 
Nebraska v. Parker; the McGirt majority all but overruled it118), the relevant 
evidence would be akin to determining how the tribal interests under-
stood the allotment agreement. This analysis is the same as the canon of 
Indian treaty construction that requires courts to consider how Indians 
understood the treaty. Allotment agreements are just contracts between 
sovereigns, after all.
117. See generally Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
118. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2468 (“Oklahoma even classifies and categorizes how we 
should approach the question of disestablishment into three ‘steps.’ It reads Solem as re-
quiring us to examine the laws passed by Congress at the first step, contemporary events 
at the second, and even later events and demographics at the third. On the State’s ac-
count, we have so far finished only the first step; two more await. . . .When interpreting 
Congress’s work in this arena, no less than any other, our charge is usually to ascertain 
and follow the original meaning of the law before us. . . .That is the only ‘step’ proper for 
a court of law.”) (citation omitted).
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Consider the ongoing suit involving the reservation of the Little 
Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians.119 The situation in that case re-
sembles the Murphy/McGirt matter in that the reservation was never dis-
established by Congress, but the tribe was overwhelmed by the entrance 
of non-Indians into tribal lands. The main difference is that the federal 
government’s implementation of the allotment agreement in the Little 
Traverse case was catastrophically incompetent and corrupt. The court 
below did take into consideration some evidence presented by the tribe 
that tribal members understood the creation of the reservation and allot-
ment to not be mutually exclusive but accepted the invitation of modern 
residents of the reservation to disclaim that evidence.
Cutting-edge thinking about the creation of Indian reservations is 
broadening to include the notion that a reservation is a homeland for an 
Indian tribe. The notion of a tribal homeland is much broader than 
merely a property interest in an area of land. In early Indian treaty cases 
before the Supreme Court, the Court accepted the idea of a tribal home-
land to find that access to water on- and off-reservation was a right im-
plied in the treaty required to effectuate the purposes of the reservation.120
More recently, as climate change and other conditions begin to negative-
ly affect Indian reservations and tribal rights, the courts have agreed that 
implied treaty rights might include, for example, the right to a healthy 
environment, healthy enough to protect the purposes of a reservation an-
yway.121
It is apparent that the Little Traverse treaty negotiators understood 
the treaty to create a homeland. That the homeland would be divided up 
into allotments is barely relevant. Sadly, that the allotted homeland was 
illegally taken by non-Indians due to the incompetence and corruption of 
federal officials was somehow not relevant to the district court. All of 
these things are critical pieces of evidence that the district court chose to 
ignore or find inconsequential.
2. Tribal Powers Cases
In the modern era—that is after 1959—the consensus of tribal ad-
vocates is that Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe is the worst case. Recall 
the case concluded that no Indian tribe (not just Suquamish) possessed 
119. Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians v. Whitmer, 398 F. Supp. 3d 201 
(W.D. Mich. 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-2070 (6th Cir.).
120. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 
(1963).
121. See e.g., In re CSRBA Case No. 49576 Subcase No. 91-7755, 448 P.3d 322, 349 
(Idaho 2019) (describing the various purposes of an Indian reservation).
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criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.122 We will address on a national 
scale, as the Court largely did, how Indians and tribes understood the 
meaning of the texts at play. We begin with the text the Court used in 
1985 to explain, at least in part, how Congress divested tribes of the 
power to prosecute non-Indians, the 1790 Trade and Intercourse Act. 
We can reasonably assume (although I do not know for sure) that no In-
dian person or tribal representative lobbied for or against this Act. How-
ever, tribes were present in the national political scene, most obviously in 
negotiating Indian treaties. Historians observe that Congress enacted the 
Act in order to both implement existing Indian treaties and to guide fu-
ture treaty negotiations.
In the years immediately preceding and for a few decades following
1790, there were many treaties addressing tribal criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians.123 Some allowed for it, some did not, some others were si-
lent. These treaties are relatively well known in legal circles because they 
are discussed in Indian affairs cases and in the legal scholarship. Whether 
tribes actually prosecuted non-Indians is less well known in those circles 
because no American court ever asked. We know, for example, that Okla-
homa tribes did exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, in some 
cases sentencing non-Indians to death by hanging for murder.124 Knowing 
these facts would be useful and frankly discoverable evidence if the judicial 
system took seriously the views of tribal interests.
I am aware of another time when tribal interests articulated their 
understandings of the scope of their criminal jurisdiction. I am aware of it 
only because the Oliphant Court mentioned a 1960 Act making it a fed-
eral crime for non-Indians to trespass and poach game in Indian country. 
In 1958, a few tribes asked the Senate to introduce and enact that bill. At 
a hearing discussing the bill, Senators asked the tribes’ counsel why they 
needed the bill, assuming that the tribes could prosecute the non-Indians 
themselves. No, the tribes’ counsel argued, of course the tribes cannot 
prosecute non-Indians. The federal government’s representatives con-
curred. The Senators were surprised and asked for authority on that 
122. 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
123. Fletcher, supra note 60, at 2 n.10 (collecting treaties).
124. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); see also Cherokee Murderers, ST. LOUIS 
GLOBE-DEMOCRAT, May 7, 1893 (describing the Cherokee Nation’s convictions of Bob 
Talton, a white man adopted by the tribe, and Jason Williams, a nonmember white man, 
and plans to execute the men for murder); Cherokee Executions Postponed, TYRONE DAILY 
HERALD (Pa.), Aug. 21, 1893 (describing the stay on the execution of Talton, who was a 
white man adopted into the tribe); Hanged an Indian, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 1, 
1896, at 5 (describing the hanging of Talton).
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proposition. I don’t know what happened in response to the request, but 
Congress passed the bill into law in 1960.125
Further, as the Court acknowledged (for a different purpose), Indi-
an tribes did prosecute non-Indians in the years leading up to the Oliphant
case. Congress even acknowledged this practice in the legislative history 
of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,126 and perhaps impliedly affirmed 
tribal powers in the text of that Act. The Court gave little weight to the 
practice of tribes, and instead seemed to point out that the relatively per-
vasive tribal practice of prosecuting non-Indians actually was justification 
for the Court to consider the issue an important one worthy of review.
The Court provides an unusually rich and deep, if confused, survey 
of the history of Indian country criminal jurisdiction in Oliphant. Within 
that survey, these texts I mention here are merely two places where tribal 
interests spoke on their jurisdiction over non-Indians. Even so, the Court 
completely ignored their views. There are likely others, most notably the 
long and rich history of the Five Civilized Tribes. Would they have al-
tered the outcome? Maybe, maybe not, but the act of considering tribal 
and Indian voices surely lends legitimacy to the interpretation of the text.
3. Federal Statutes of General Applicability
What about federal statutes of general applicability,127 particularly 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)? Indian law scholars have ex-
amined thoroughly the legislative history of the NLRA, looking for evi-
dence about whether Congress was thinking about Indian tribes in 
1935.128 There is no more there than there is in the text itself. No one has 
examined whether Indians and tribes, which were also in the public eye 
during the 1930s, were involved in the labor disputes of the time. Surely 
Indian people were involved in labor disputes.129
125. Pub. L. 86-634, § 2, 74 Stat. 469 (1960) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1165 
(2012)).
126. Pub. L. 90-284, tit. II, § 201, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1303 (2012)).
127. One could argue that a statute of general applicability is not an Indian affairs stat-
ute, almost by definition. However, once the government and the courts purport to apply 
those texts to tribal governments, they become Indian affairs statutes.
128. See, e.g., Riley Plumer, Overriding Tribal Sovereignty by Applying the National Labor 
Relations Act to Indian Tribes in Soaring Eagle and Resort v. NLRB, 35 LAW &
INEQUALITY 131 (2017); Bryan H. Wildenthal, Federal Labor Law, Indian Sovereignty, and 
the Canons of Construction, 86 OR. L. REV. 413 (2007).
129. See e.g., Indians Voice Labor Demand: Association Seeks Preference for Tribesmen in Sene-
ca School Work, MIAMI DAILY NEWS (Okla.), Dec. 29, 1935, at 1, 2; see also Letter to the 
Editor, Scores Indian Labor: Alpine Supervisor Says Aborigines Are Not to Be Trusted for Con-
tinuous Effort, SAC. BEE, May 26, 1922, at 24.
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The 1934 Indian Reorganization Act130 revolutionized tribal gov-
ernments. For the first time, Congress asked tribal governments to opt 
into a new form of governance. Most tribes did, and hundreds of tribes 
deliberated extensively over whether to accept Congress’s offer. About 
two-thirds of tribes that voted agreed to opt in to the 1934 Act.131 There 
is a deep historical record of tribal government activity in the 1930s,132
but the scholarly record of which I am aware is devoid of tribal views on 
labor relations. Some of the tribal discussions explicitly mention the jobs 
that would be created on reservations if tribal governments took over 
primary governance authority.133 Other discussions noted that there 
would be more jobs than qualified Indians, requiring tribes to hire non-
members.134
That Indian people and tribes were thinking about labor in 1934 in 
the same time frame that Congress was considering a federal labor rela-
tions law is relevant evidence about whether tribal interests would have 
understood the NLRA to apply to Indians and tribes. Textualism’s gaze 
would ignore those views, but it’s a start.
CONCLUSION
In 1937, after the enactment of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare 
Act,135 Oklahoma Indian tribes were able to reorganize in a matter akin 
to how other tribes had done under the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act. 
Two tribal towns in Oklahoma petitioned to reorganize, seeking recog-
nition as federally recognized tribes. Tribal town organizations were 
known as Talwa, loosely translated as “town.”136 Prior to the Civil War, 
the Talwa were the focus of tribal governmental power and resisted the 
centralization of tribal government, which was what the United States 
preferred. After the Civil War, the United States succeeded in forcing 
tribal governmental power to be focused in a national government, what 
130. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 
5101-5129 (2012)).
131. Kenneth R. Philp, Termination: A Legacy of the Indian New Deal, 14 WESTERN 
HIST. Q. 165, 170 (1983).
132. The records of the tribal meetings to debate whether to accept the provisions of 
the 1934 Act are collected in THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT: CONGRESSES AND 
BILLS (Vine Deloria, Jr. ed., 2002).
133. Id. at 117 (Oregon Indians); id. at 137 (same).
134. Id. at 159 (Navajo).
135. Act of June 26, 1936, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5210 
(2012)).
136. Memorandum from Frederic L. Kirgis, Acting Solicitor, Dep’t of the Interior, to 
Comm’r of Indian Affairs 2 (July 15, 1937).
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we now call the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. The tribal towns lost power 
on paper but continued to govern as they always had. After the estab-
lishment of the national tribal government, the tribal towns still con-
trolled elections, annuity payments, and tribal citizenship. Even after al-
lotment, the towns’ political activities continued apace and 
uninterrupted. Ultimately, the United States acknowledged the tribal 
towns as separate tribes.
In the McGirt and Murphy cases, Oklahoma and the United States 
argued that Congress had effectively terminated the Muscogee (Creek) 
Reservation, in part, because the tribe had been divested of governmental 
powers over large portions of the land by virtue of allotment, and in 
1898 when Congress terminated tribal courts. But for the tribal towns, 
nothing changed. They continued to govern as if nothing happened, 
which means tribal governance remained—perhaps underground—but 
real and unfortunately, beyond the narrow gaze of the textualist judge.
The text matters. But what texts matter most is dependent on what 
draws the interpreter’s gaze. Throughout the history of federal Indian 
law, the text is almost always written by non-Indian, privileged white 
men, and secondarily by other privileged persons. Even Indian treaties 
negotiated at arm’s length were not “written” by Indian people. Federal 
judicial opinions are not written by Indian people, either. But these texts 
govern Indian people and Indian tribes and they have engaged with those 
texts from the initial execution of those texts. Indian and tribal under-
standings of the meanings of these texts is indispensable in the interpreta-
tion of these texts. So far, the judiciary does not privilege those interpre-
tations.
Tribal advocates view the Supreme Court with intense skepticism 
and cynicism. Few tribal advocates believe the Court as an institution or 
as a grouping of judges respects tribal interests and claim the Court does 
not know enough about how its decisions affect Indian country when it 
makes Indian law. In contrast, tribal interests are always involved in legis-
lative and regulatory activities. As Kirsten Carlson shows, there is evi-
dence that tribes out-perform their expected or perceived status in Con-
gress.137 But not so at the Supreme Court.
A large part of the answer is very simple—the textualist gaze ignores 
or downplays (if not outright disrespects) tribal and individual Indian un-
derstandings of the meanings of texts. Serious and honest engagement 
with all of the stakeholders’ interpretations of texts is a minimum baseline 
for legitimate judicial decision-making.
137. E.g., Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress and Indians, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 77 (2015); 
Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Lobbying Against the Odds, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 23 (2019).
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Justice Gorsuch and Chief Justice Roberts drew lines in the sand in 
McGirt. Where will the Court go from here?
